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Short Selling Pressure and Corporate Social Responsibility Performance: 
Evidence from a Natural Experiment 
 
Abstract 
Using Regulation SHO as a natural experiment, we show that managers respond to a 
positive exogenous shock of short selling pressure by enhancing corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) performance. The positive effect of short selling on CSR is mainly 
driven by improvements in stakeholder CSR, rather than third party CSR; and by 
improvements in CSR strengths, rather than reductions in CSR concerns. We further find 
that the effect is more pronounced for firms that locate in environments where CSR is 
emphasized by their stakeholders. Moreover, we find that managers are more likely to 
issue CSR reports that convey information about firms’ CSR activities to the public 
during the implementation of Regulation SHO period. Overall, our evidence is consistent 
with our conjecture that managers use CSR strategically to deter short sellers by creating 
a positive image of the firm. 
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Short Selling Pressure and Corporate Social Responsibility Performance: 
Evidence from a Natural Experiment 
1. Introduction 
Short selling is important in the U.S. stock markets. Despite being important 
contributors to efficient stock pricing due to their information advantages, short sellers 
are generally unwelcome by firm managers. The headlines of the business press are often 
dominated by disputes between managers and short sellers. A recent survey by NYSE 
finds that most CEOs blame short selling for reduced share price and the resulting 
negative effects on investor confidence (NYSE, 2008). Moreover, Khanna and Mathews 
(2012) argue that “the damage of short-selling is caused not so much by the initial drop in 
stock price, but through its feedback effect on the real decisions of the firm’s 
counterparties since that not only amplifies the firm’s price drop but also makes it more 
permanent”. 
Given these expected costs associated with short selling for firms, managers have 
incentives to take action to discourage short sellers and to mitigate the potential impact of 
short selling on the firm. However, research on how firms respond strategically to short 
selling pressure is limited. Some studies examine the use of legal action (Lamont, 2012), 
stock repurchases (Liu and Swanson, 2011), insider stock purchases (Laksanabunsong 
and Wu, 2014), and management forecasts (Li and Zhang, 2015) to deter and/or counter 
the effect of short selling. The present study focuses on firms’ non-financial performance, 
a hitherto unexplored response to short selling. Specifically, we examine how managers 
respond to short selling pressure by altering their performance in corporate social 
responsibility (CSR). 
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CSR has become a major phenomenon among U.S. firms over the past several 
decades. Many firms have expressed CSR commitments, initiated CSR projects, and 
issued CSR reports. While the literature on whether CSR increases firm value is largely 
divided (see Margolis et al., 2007 for a review), the literature tends to agree that CSR 
creates a positive firm image (Fombrun and Shanley, 1990; Luo and Bhattacharya, 2006; 
McWilliams et al., 2006). The general view is that firms with good CSR fulfill an ethical 
obligation to their stakeholders and to society, and this ethical obligation constrains 
corporate involvement in unethical activities. Consistent with this view that positive 
image is associated with ethical corporate behavior, several studies find that firms with 
good CSR engage in less real or accrual earnings management, are less likely to be 
subject to Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) enforcement action (Kim et al., 
2012), are less tax aggressive (Lanis and Richardson, 2012; Hoi et al., 2013), and exhibit 
lower incidence of insider trading (Gao et al., 2014). 
A number of studies suggest that firms can benefit from a positive corporate image 
in various ways, including attracting talent and charging customers or investors premiums 
(Greening and Turban, 2000; Richardson and Welker, 2001; Lev et al., 2010). Recent 
studies show that the positive image created by engaging in CSR can help firms buffer 
against the impact of future negative events. For example, Minor and Morgan (2011) 
show that firms with better CSR ratings experience smaller stock price drops when they 
announce product recalls. Hong and Liskovich (2015) argue that CSR generates a halo 
effect, which results in CSR firms incurring lower fines from corrupt activities. 
Drawing on this research, we argue that, in response to increasing short selling 
pressure, managers have incentive to create a positive firm image by enhancing CSR 
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performance. This is because short sellers profit from stocks where they expect the stock 
price to decline through uncovering bad news about the firm. If a firm’s engagement in 
CSR indicates less unethical behavior that may cause a future drop in share price, and/or 
it suggests lower future impact of bad news on its stock price, short sellers may be 
deterred from taking positions against the firm, since there will be less profit when the 
short selling position is closed. This conjecture requires only that managers believe that 
positive firm image can deter short sellers or mitigate the potential drop in share price on 
bad news discovery. This belief appears to be reasonable. A recent survey suggests that 
practicing CSR can influence public perception of a firm’s behavior and help the firm 
rebuild trust and regain credibility. 1  Moreover, anecdotal evidence suggests that 
demonstrations of good-faith effort can mitigate potential losses from adverse events. For 
example, if a firm’s good-faith effort at safety compliance can be shown by their effort in 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) related CSR issues, such as 
safety training and consistently enforced safety rules, penalties may be reduced by OSHA. 
Admittedly, it is possible that, rather than enhancing CSR performance, managers 
may cut firms’ efforts in CSR when facing increasing short selling pressure, for two 
reasons. First, CSR is a long-term investment with uncertain returns to firm values 
(Friedman, 1970; Fieseler, 2011). Short selling could create tremendous price pressure on 
a firm’s stock (e.g., Mitchell et al., 2004). As a consequence, managers who care about 
short-term stock prices or operating performance may cut CSR spending and focus more 
effort on routine tasks that offer faster and more stable returns. Second, it is possible that 
managers invest in CSR for their own self-interests (Barnea and Rubin, 2010; Friedman, 
                                                 
1 For instance, Adam Friedman Associates (2012) survey CSR executives at Fortune 1000 firms and 
identify reputation building as the primary motivation behind CSR initiatives. 
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1970). Since short sellers can discipline managers by monitoring their actions through 
short selling, a mismanaged firm facing increasing short selling pressure may have 
incentives to cut firms’ efforts in CSR. While ultimately an empirical question, these 
latter arguments are likely to bias our results against our directional prediction, that is, 
facing increasing short selling pressure, managers enhance firms’ CSR performance. 
To test our prediction, we exploit a natural experiment based on SEC regulation 
SHO (Reg SHO). Short selling activities in the U.S. had been largely constrained. The 
uptick rule, which had been in place from the 1930s to July 2004, prohibits short sales 
when stock prices are declining, significantly impeding the execution of short sales. In 
July 2004, the SEC announced a pilot program under the Rule 202T of Reg SHO 
temporarily removing the uptick rule restriction for an ex ante randomly selected pilot 
group of firms (about one-third of the Russell 3000 firms listed on NYSE, NASDAQ, and 
AMEX) from May 2, 2005 to August 6, 2007. This sudden regulatory change 
significantly reduced the cost of short selling, thus increasing short selling pressure only 
for these pilot firms, but not for non-pilot firms (the remaining two-thirds of the Russell 
3000). 
This combination of the randomization of the pilot firms and an exogenous shock 
to the short selling constraint creates a clean setting in which to examine the effect of 
short selling pressure (as affected by short selling constraints) on a firm’s CSR 
performance. In particular, this experiment emphasizes how firms respond when they 
experience the mere threat of an increased likelihood of being shorted (an increase in 
short selling pressure), which does not require these firms to experience actual increases 
in short selling activity. Using a differences-in-differences (hereafter, DiD) regression 
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approach, we analyze the impact of short selling pressure on firm’s CSR performance. 
Consistent with prior studies, firm’s CSR performance is measured by total CSR score, 
constructed from the MSCI STATS database.2 We find that an increase in short selling 
pressure due to Reg SHO leads to a larger increase in CSR performance for the treatment 
(pilot) group compared to the control (non-pilot) group. Our results are robust to various 
alternative measures of CSR and to controlling for firm fixed effects. These results are in 
line with our prediction that, facing increasing short selling pressure, managers enhance 
CSR performance. 
To probe more deeply how pilot firms increase their CSR performance during the 
pilot period, we examine the subcomponents of the total (aggregate) CSR scores. We 
differentiate between stakeholder CSR, which mainly concerns corporate stakeholders 
such as employees and customers, and third-party CSR, which focuses on society in 
general. We also differentiate between CSR strengths and concerns. We find that the 
improved CSR performance by treatment firms is driven mainly: (1) by stakeholder CSR, 
rather than third party CSR; and (2) by improvements in CSR strengths, rather than 
reductions in CSR concerns.  
We also investigate whether incentives to invest in CSR increase with the degree of 
CSR emphasis in the state where a firm headquarters. We find that the positive impact of 
short selling pressure on CSR is stronger for firms headquarter in “blue” (liberal or 
Democratic-leaning) states than those headquarter in “red” (conservative or Republican-
leaning) states, and for firms that are subject to more rather than less religious influence.3 
                                                 
2 MSCI STATS is the successor to Kinder, Lydenberg and Domini (KLD), Innovest, and IRRC. MSCI 
STATS categorizes CSR items as qualitative issues or controversial business issues. 
3 We measure religious influence using the religion ranking of the state in which the firm's headquarter is 
located. The religion ranking is obtained from the Association of Religion Data Archive. 
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These results suggest that the positive impact of short selling pressure on firm’s CSR 
performance is more pronounced in an environment where the firm’s CSR activities are 
emphasized by its stakeholders. 
Finally, we investigate the impact of short selling pressure on a firm’s likelihood of 
issuing CSR reports. If managers believe good CSR performance can signal their firms’ 
overall goodness, managers may have incentive to actively convey such information to 
potential audiences in the market (including short sellers). We find that, during the 
implementation of Reg SHO, pilot firms significantly increase their likelihood of issuing 
standalone CSR reports compared to the control firms in the same period. 
This study is related to several strands of literature. First, our study is part of the 
emerging literature on the real effects of secondary financial markets. Prior studies 
suggest that the secondary stock market has an effect on the real decisions of managers 
(Bond et al., 2012), including market quality (Diether et al., 2009), disclosure policies 
(Cheng et al., 2014; Fang et al., 2015; Li and Zhang, 2015), investment and equity 
issuance (Grullon et al., 2015), executive compensation structure (De Angelis et al., 
2013), and corporate innovation (He and Tian, 2014). Our study shows that short selling 
pressure has a causal effect on managers’ decisions relating to non-financial performance. 
Second, we contribute to the literature on determinants of CSR. Prior studies 
examine the effect of various firm- and institutional-level determinants of CSR. Our 
study extends this line of research by showing that short sellers influence firm CSR 
decisions. This impact of short sellers on CSR differs from that of the other market 
participants. While the impact of other market participants on CSR is through their 
demand for CSR, the impact of short sellers is indirect and likely arises from managers’ 
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desire to influence market perception and to discourage short sellers. In this regard, our 
results are also relevant to prior studies that focus on firms’ strategic response to short 
selling. 
Third, we contribute to the emerging literature on managerial strategic use of CSR. 
Porter and Kramer (2006) argue that CSR and business operations are interdependent, 
and propose that CSR is integrated into corporate policy to achieve corporate goals. 
Consistent with this view, prior studies examine how CSR can be used as a tool to 
strengthen firms’ relations with corporate stakeholders to retain competitiveness 
(Flammer, 2014), or to manage earnings (Petrovits 2006; Chih et al., 2008). Our results 
suggest that managers use CSR to deter short sellers by creating a positive corporate 
image. 
Finally, our study provides additional evidence on the effect of short selling 
regulations. While Reg SHO intends to test market quality (e.g., Diether et al., 2009), 
prior studies document unintended consequences of Reg SHO on corporate disclosure 
decisions (Fang et al., 2015; Cheng et al., 2014; Li and Zhang, 2015), design of CEO 
compensation (De Angelis et al., 2013), investment and equity issuance decisions 
(Grullon et al., 2015), and corporate innovation (He and Tian, 2014). 
2. Theory and Hypothesis 
2.1. Short selling 
Short selling represents a significant fraction of overall trading activity in the US 
stock markets (Diether et al., 2009). Despite the widespread belief that short selling can 
contribute to market efficiency (e.g., Drake et al., 2011; Engelberg et al., 2012; 
Christensen et al., 2014), critics claim that it brings substantial costs to the affected firms, 
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since short selling places immediate downward pressure on firm stock price, which 
adversely impacts the firm’s investors’ and other stakeholders’ confidence. In particular, 
in some cases, such loss in confidence further damages long-run financing and operating 
activities. For example, Khanna and Mathews (2012) argue that, since a firm’s 
counterparties’ decisions may be affected by stock price, short sellers can have a real 
impact on these counterparties’ decisions by manipulating the stock price downward. 
Goldstein and Guembel (2008) show analytically how a trader can be incentivized to take 
short positions in a firm’s stock due to the impact of a sharp stock price decline on the 
real value of the firm. Consistent with this reasoning, a recent survey by NYSE finds that 
most CEOs blame short selling for reduced stock price and the resulting effect on 
investor confidence (NYSE, 2008). Aggressive short selling is blamed for the fall of 
many firms, such as Lehaman Brothers, American International Group, and 
Overstock.com. As pointed out by Soros (2009), “the mispricing of financial instruments 
can affect the fundamentals that market prices are supposed to reflect.” 
Considering these aforementioned expected costs associated with short selling for 
firms, managers have incentive to take various actions to discourage short sellers and to 
mitigate the potential impact of short selling on the firm. Prior research provides limited 
evidence on the various actions undertaken by firms against short sellers. Lamont (2012) 
examines the use of legal threats, investigations, lawsuits, and various technical actions 
intended to combat short selling. Liu and Swanson (2011) examine whether firms use 
stock repurchases to deter short interest. Laksanabunsong and Wu (2014) examine the use 
of insider purchases to counter the effect of short selling. Using Reg SHO as a setting that 
generates exogenous increases in short selling pressure, recent studies find that managers 
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respond to increased short selling pressure by reducing earnings management (Fang et al., 
2015), reducing the precision of bad news forecasts (Li and Zhang, 2015), and increasing 
the release of good news and accelerating the release of bad news (Cheng et al., 2014). 
The present study focuses on firms’ non-financial performance, a hitherto unexplored 
factor. Specifically, we examine how managers respond to short selling pressure by 
altering firms’ CSR performance. 
2.2. CSR 
CSR is an issue of growing interest. While there are numerous debates on whether 
CSR improves firm value, studies generally suggest that CSR helps firms establish a 
positive corporate image (Fombrun and Shanley, 1990; Luo and Bhattacharya, 2006; 
McWilliams et al., 2006). CSR represents the “right” courses of action that take into 
account not only economic, but also social, environmental, and other externalized 
impacts of company actions. By engaging in CSR, a firm demonstrates its commitment to 
ethical obligations to various stakeholders, which dissuades them from unethical 
corporate behavior (e.g., Porter and Kramer, 2006; McWilliams et al., 2006). 
Consistent with this notion that positive corporate image is associated with less 
unethical behavior, prior studies find that firms with good CSR engage in less unethical 
behavior. Kim, Park and Wier (2012) find that firms exhibiting good CSR also constrain 
earnings management. These authors argue that managers are likely to be driven by 
ethical concerns to produce high-quality financial reports. Gao et al. (2014) show that 
executives of CSR firms are less likely to engage in insider trading and profit 
significantly less from insider trades than executives of non-CSR firms. These authors 
argue that firms with good corporate images tend to refrain from insider trading, 
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consistent with the argument in the economic literature that reputation is like an informal 
contract against opportunism. Lanis and Richardson (2012) and Hoi et al. (2013) 
document that firms with higher CSR scores are less aggressive in avoiding taxes. Hoi et 
al. (2013) argue that when a firm commits to social good, it often cultivates a corporate 
culture of “do no evil,” which encompasses less aggressive tax avoidance. 
A fair amount of research suggests that the positive corporate image resulting from 
engaging in CSR can benefit a firm in various ways, including extending organizational 
networks (Fombrun, 1996), attracting customers who care about CSR (Lev et al., 2010), 
attracting talented employees and boosting employee moral (Greening and Turban, 2000; 
Bénabou and Tirole, 2010), and charging socially aware investors a premium for the 
firm’s securities (Anderson and Frankel, 1980; Richardson and Welker, 2001). Recent 
studies suggest that the positive image created by engaging in CSR can help firms protect 
themselves against the risk of adverse political, regulatory, and social penalties in case of 
negative corporate events (Godfrey, 2005; Godfrey et al., 2009; Minor and Morgan, 2011; 
Hoi et al., 2013). Godfrey (2005) theorizes that a positive CSR reputation is particularly 
important when negative corporate events occur, because it provides some degree of 
insurance protection by increasing the likelihood of positive attributions from society’s 
arbiters. Godfrey et al. (2009) conduct an event study of 178 negative legal or regulatory 
actions against firms, and find that certain types of CSR can mitigate the effect of these 
negative events on firm stock performance. Minor and Morgan (2011) show that firms 
with better CSR ratings experience smaller stock price drops when they announce 
product recalls. Using OSHA penalties and government contract awards, Jeffers (2015) 
shows that officials are more lenient with penalties and more generous with awards for 
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good CSR firms than for bad CSR firms. Using Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
enforcements, Hong and Liskovich (2015) show that bribery penalties are significantly 
lower for firms with high CSR levels and contend that CSR generates a halo effect, a 
cognitive bias, which affects prosecutors’ impressions of the firms involved. 
2.3. Link between CSR and short selling 
This study examines the impact of an exogenous increase in short selling pressure 
using a natural experiment, Reg SHO. As discussed above, short selling brings significant 
costs to firms; managers may act strategically to deter short sellers and/or mitigate the 
negative impact of short selling. We argue that, in response to increasing short selling 
pressure, managers have incentives to create a positive firm image by enhancing firms’ 
CSR performance. This is because short sellers profit on stocks for which they expect the 
stock price to decline after uncovering bad news about a firm. A firm's commitment to 
CSR indicates its effort to refrain from unethical behavior, resulting in less bad news for 
the short seller to discover. For example, a firm with a high CSR level commits to 
corporate transparency, thereby providing investors with more reliable, transparent, and 
timely financial information. In fact, Atkins (2006) claims that transparency is what the 
investing public really means by “social responsibility.” 
Moreover, since CSR can help firms buffer the impact of future negative effects, 
the adverse effect on stock price may be lower for firms with high CSR levels on 
discovery of bad news by short sellers. Therefore, given the potential lower likelihood of 
uncovering bad news and the lower magnitude of price drop due to discovery of bad news 
for firms with high CSR levels compared with firms with low CSR levels, the expected 
benefits of short selling are lower for firms with high CSR levels, compared with firms 
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with low CSR levels. As a consequence, short sellers may be deterred from taking 
positions in firms with high CSR, since there is less profit to be earned when the positions 
are closed. Reg SHO significantly relaxed short sale constraints on the pilot stocks, which 
significantly increased short selling pressure on these firms. To alleviate the increased 
short selling pressure, managers can improve firms’ CSR performance. We thus propose 
and test the following hypothesis in alternative form: 
Hypothesis: Pilot firms enhance their CSR performance relative to control firms during 
the Reg SHO implementation period. 
On the contrary, it is also possible that managers may cut CSR efforts when facing 
increasing short selling pressure; thus, the null of our hypothesis would be supported. 
This is because CSR is a long-term investment with uncertain returns to firm value 
(Fieseler, 2011); facing increasing price pressure from short sellers, managers may have 
to cut CSR to boost short-term performance and stock price. Moreover, if some of the 
CSR effort is for managers’ self-interests (Barnea and Rubin, 2010; Friedman, 1970), the 
threat of shorting shares in these mismanaged firms may motivate managers to cut these 
self-serving investments. While ultimately an empirical question, these arguments are 
likely to bias our results against our directional prediction. 
3. Research Design 
3.1. Sample 
On July 28, 2004, the SEC announced a pilot program in which 986 stocks from the 
Russell 3000 index were selected based on liquidity, volatility, market depth, and trading 
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volume.4 These stocks would be allowed to trade without being subject to the provisions 
of the uptick rule (Rule 10a-1) and any short sale price test of any exchange or national 
securities association during the term of the pilot program (May 2, 2005 to August 6, 
2007). The remaining stocks in the Russell 3000 Index function as the control group. 
We start from a list of the Russell 3000 Index member firms and merge it with the 
pilot firm list announced by the SEC. We then obtain the CSR scores for the pilot and 
control firms from the MSCI STATS database. Finally, we merge the control variables 
obtained from COMPUSTAT (financial data), Center for Research in Securities Prices 
(stock price and volume data), and I/B/E/S (analyst following data). Following Fang et al. 
(2015), we set our sample period from 2001 to 2003 and 2005 to 20075, and delete firms 
in the financial services (SIC 6000-6999) and utilities (SIC 4900-4949) industries. This 
procedure leads to a final sample of 2,577 firm–year observations for 635 unique pilot 
firms and 5,389 firm–year observations for 1,380 unique control firms with non-missing 
control variables. 
3.2. Empirical model 
Following Fang et al. (2015) and Li and Zhang (2015), we use firm–year 
observations for both pilot and non-pilot firms for the three-year window before (2001-
2003) and three-year window during (2005-2007) Reg SHO’s pilot program and estimate 
the following model: 
CSRit = β0 + β1PILOTi×DURt + β2DURt + β3PILOTi + β4SIZEit-1 + β5LEVERAGEit-1 
+ β6MBit-1 + β7ROAit-1 + β8FIRM_AGEit-1 + β9LIQUIDITYit-1 + β10DIVit-1 
                                                 
4 See http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/34-50104.htm for details. 
5 Unlike Fang et al. (2015), we exclude the period 2008 to 2010 in our main sample because we do not test 
the effect of the difference between pilot and non-pilot firms in the post-pilot period in our main test. We 
conduct an additional test in Section xx with the inclusion of this period. 
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+ β11LITIGATIONi + β12GLOBALit-1 + β13COVERAGEit-1 + εit                      (1) 
where CSR is the Corporate Social Responsibility score constructed based on the MSCI 
STATS.6 The MSCI STATS categorizes CSR items as qualitative issues or controversial 
business issues. Consistent with prior studies (e.g., El Ghoul et al., 2011; Kim et al., 2012; 
Servaes and Tamayo, 2013; Di Giuli and Kostovetsky, 2014; Gao et al., 2014), we focus 
only on the qualitative issues, excluding corporate governance, in constructing CSR. 
Specifically, we calculate a firm’s CSR as a firm’s total strengths minus total weaknesses, 
based on MSCI’s evaluations for community relations, humanity, diversity, employee 
relations, environment, and product characteristics.7 Following Dhaliwal et al. (2011), we 
adjust the CSR scores by industry median to make them comparable across industries.  
As the number of strengths and concerns change over time when MSCI STATS 
adds or deletes certain category, we also employ CSR measure based on Deng et al. 
(2013), CSR_ADJ, which is constructed by dividing the strength and concern scores for 
each dimension by respective number of strength and concern indicators to derive 
adjusted strength and concern scores for that dimension and then taking the difference 
between the adjusted total strength score and the adjusted total concern score.8  
PILOT is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm’s stock is designated a pilot 
stock in the Reg SHO pilot program, zero otherwise; DUR is an indicator variable that 
                                                 
6 The MSCI STATS covers a large number of firms, and a wide range of CSR categories, and is widely 
used in the CSR research (e.g., Kim et al., 2012; Deng et al., 2013; Hoi et al., 2013; Servaes and Tamayo, 
2013; Di Giuli and Kostovetsky, 2014; Gao et al., 2014; Dong et al., 2015). The MSCI STATS starts in 
1991, with initial coverage on firms in the S&P 500 and Domini 400 Social Index, and expands to Russell 
3000 firms over time. 
7 The MSCI STATS evaluates a firm’s CSR performance based on the number of strength items and 
concern items in each category. For each category, a firm receives a score of 1 if it has the corresponding 
strength or concern, and 0 otherwise. 
8 For example, suppose that in 2004 the summations of the KLD strength indicators across the seven 
dimensions are 0, 1, 1, 2, 1, 0, and 1 and the numbers of strength indicators across the seven dimensions 
are 4, 3, 3, 5, 7, 4, and 4. According to our definition, the adjusted total strength score for the firm is equal 
to 0/4 + 1/3 + 1/3 + 2/5 + 1/7 + 0/4 + 1/4 = 1.45. If the adjusted total concern is 1.25, which is calculated 
in the same way as the adjusted total strength score, then the adjusted CSR score will be 1.45 - 1.25 = 0.2. 
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equals 1 if a firm’s fiscal year-end falls between January 1, 2005 and December 31, 2007, 
zero otherwise. Our variables of interest are the DiD variables, PILOTi×DURt. A positive 
and significant β1 supports that our hypothesis that pilot firms increase CSR relative to 
control firms during the Reg SHO implementation period. 
Following prior studies on CSR (e.g., Dhaliwal et al., 2011), we include a vector of 
firm characteristics, which can affect a firm’s CSR score. Specifically, we control for 
firm market value (SIZE), debt-to-asset ratio (LEVERAGE), market-to-book ratio (MB), 
return on assets (ROA), firm age (FIRM_AGE), share liquidity over the fiscal year 
(LIQUIDITY), dividend payment (DIV), litigation risk (LITIGATION), global focus 
indicator (GLOBAL), analyst coverage indicator (COVERAGE), and management 
forecast indicator (FORECAST). See the Appendix for more detailed variable definitions. 
3.3. Descriptive statistics 
Panel A of Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of all variables used in our sample. 
In Panel B we compare the firm characteristics of the treatment and control groups 
measured in 2003, the year immediately preceding the Reg SHO pilot program 
announcement. The two groups of firms exhibit similar mean values for all variables, 
except for some minor differences in FIRM_AGE and DIV. Overall, consistent with the 
random selection procedure of the SEC, pilot firms and control firms are very similar 
prior to the Reg SHO pilot program.  
Panel C reports the results for univariate DiD tests examining our hypothesis. The 
mean of our CSR measure, CSR, during the three-year period preceding the pilot program 
(2001–2003) is -0.015 for pilot firms, which is 0.136 less than that for non-pilot firms. 
During the three-year period of the pilot program, mean CSR increases from -0.015 to 
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0.145 for pilot firms, while it decreases from 0.121 to -0.034 for non-pilot firms, which 
causes mean CSR to become 0.083 higher for pilot firms than for non-pilot firms. 
Untabulated results also show that, for all the CSR measures used in this paper, the 
difference between the mean value for pilot firms and control firms is negative prior to 
the Reg SHO pilot program, and it becomes positive during the Reg SHO pilot program.9 
These results provide some evidence that, when facing an increase in short selling 
pressure due to Reg SHO, managers have incentives to create a positive firm image by 
enhancing CSR performance. 
[TABLE 1 HERE] 
4. Empirical Results 
Throughout this paper, we use two specifications: the first specification is the OLS 
regressions with robust standard errors adjusted for firm clustering, as in most of the prior 
literature on CSR; the second specification is estimated with the inclusion of firm fixed 
effects to control for unobserved time-invariant firm characteristics. We tabulate the 
regression results using two measures of CSR: the CSR measure adjusted for the number 
of strengths/concerns (Deng et al., 2013) and the raw CSR measure adjusted for industry 
median (Dhaliwal et al., 2011). 
4.1. Main Results 
Table 2 reports the regression results based on Eq. (1). As shown in columns (1) to 
(4), the coefficient on PILOT×DUR, β1, is positive and significant at the one percent level 
across both the OLS and firm fixed effects specifications, which is consistent with the 
                                                 
9 Except for CSR_CON, which we introduce in Section 4.2.. 
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univariate DiD results reported in Panel C of Table 1. This finding is consistent with the 
prediction of our hypothesis that pilot firms enhance their CSR performance relative to 
control firms during the Reg SHO implementation period.  
In terms of economic significance, the results in columns (1) and (3) indicate that 
our CSR measure, CSR (CSR_ADJ), is 0.256 (0.046) higher for the treatment group than 
for the control group during the three-year period of the pilot program compared to the 
three-year pre-pilot period. This corresponds to 12.52% (12.67%) of the standard 
deviation of CSR (CSR_ADJ) in the pooled sample, 2.044 (0.363).  Controlling for firm 
fixed effects, the results in columns (2) and (4) indicate that, CSR (CSR_ADJ), is 0.170 
(0.032) higher for the treatment group than for the control group during the three-year 
period of the pilot program compared to the three-year pre-pilot period. This corresponds 
to 8.32% (8.82%) of the standard deviation of CSR (CSR_ADJ) in the pooled sample. 
Consistent with prior research (e.g., Fang et al., 2015), the R2 across all columns are low 
(3.4% to 8.7%), indicating that most of the cross-sectional differences in CSR are due to 
unmodeled factors 
Overall, our results are consistent with our conjecture that managers have 
incentives to create a positive firm image by enhancing CSR performance in response to 
increasing short selling pressure. 
4.2. Subcomponents of CSR 
The measure of a firm’s CSR performance for our main test, CSR (or CSR_ADJ), is 
an aggregate measure that is equal to the firm’s total strengths minus total weakness over 
various qualitative issue areas, to shed more light on how pilot firms enhance CSR 
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performance facing increasing short selling pressure, we examine the subcomponents of 
the aggregate CSR scores.  
4.2.1. CSR strength vs. CSR concern 
Prior studies suggest that a firm’s effort is more likely to be captured by CSR 
strengths than CSR concerns as the latter  are  likely to be the outcome of other corporate 
activities, which is  unrelated to corporate effort (Servaes and Tayamo, 2013; Dong et al., 
2015). For example, a firm’s poor scores in the environmental area (CSR concerns) is 
likely due to its corporate production technology in place, while the donation the firm 
made to local communities is more likely to reflect its effort to improve its performance 
in the community areas (CSR strengths). Thus, it is possible that, when facing increased 
short selling pressure, a firm’s effort to improve CSR performance is mainly driven by 
increases in CSR strengths rather than decreases in concerns. 
To test our conjecture, we split measures of CSR (CSR or CSR_ADJ) up into CSR 
strengths (CSR_STR or CSR_STR_ADJ) and CSR concerns (CSR_CON or 
CSR_CON_ADJ). CSR_STR (CSR_CON) is the sum of a firm’s industry adjusted strength 
(concern) scores over community relations, humanity, diversity, employee relations, 
environment, and product characteristics. CSR_STR_ADJ (CSR_CON_ADJ) is the sum of 
a firm’s strength (concern) scores based on Deng et al. (2013). The strength (concern) 
scores for each of the MSCI’s evaluation dimensions (e.g., community relations, 
humanity, diversity, employee relations, environment, and product characteristics) are 
calculated by dividing the raw strength (concern) scores by respective number of strength 
(concern) indictors to derived adjusted strength scores for that dimension. We re-estimate 
Equation (1) using each of these subcomponents of CSR as the dependent variable. Table 
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3 respectively report the regression results using CSR strengths and CSR concerns as the 
dependent variables. Note that columns (1), (3) and (5) presents the coefficient estimates 
using the OLS regression and columns (2), (4) and (6) present the coefficient estimates 
using regression that controls for firm fixed effects.  
Table 3 shows that, using CSR strengths (CSR_STR or CSR_STR_ADJ) as the 
dependent variable, the coefficients on PILOT×DUR are positive and significant, at less 
than 5 percent level for the OLS specification (columns (1) and (3)) and at less than the 
one percent level for the firm fixed effects specification (columns (2) and (4)). These 
results suggest that, facing increasing short-selling pressures, firms enhance CSR 
performance by increasing CSR strengths. Using CSR concerns  (CSR_CON or 
CSR_CON) as the dependent variable, the coefficient on PILOT×DUR is negative across 
columns (5) to (8) and is only significant at less than the ten percent level for the firm 
fixed effects specification using CSR_CON_ADJ (column (8)). These results suggest that 
reducing CSR concerns do not seem to be the main driver that increases CSR. 
Overall, our results are consistent with prior studies (e.g. Servaes and Tayamo, 
2013; Dong et al., 2015) and suggest that firms try to improve their CSR performance 
during the Reg SHO implementation period and the improvement is more likely to be 
manifested in increased CSR strengths than in reduced concerns. 
 [TABLE 3 HERE] 
4.2.2. Stakeholder CSR vs. third-party CSR 
CSR is multidimensional concept that encompasses a variety of areas, such as the 
community, the environment, human rights and employees. While some of these areas 
relate to general society, others focus on stakeholders such as employees and consumers 
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(Servaes and Tamayo, 2013). To probe more into the CSR performance during the Reg 
SHO implementation period, we split measures of CSR (CSR or CSR_ADJ) up into 
stakeholder CSR that mainly focuses on key stakeholders (CSR_STK or CSR_STK_ADJ) 
and third-party CSR that mainly focuses on general society (CSR_THIRD or 
CSR_THIRD_ADJ). Specifically, CSR_STK (CSR_THIRD) is the sum of industry 
adjusted corporate social responsibility (CSR) scores over diversity, employees and 
products (community, environment and human rights). It is estimated by scaling the raw 
strength and concern scores of each category by the number of items of the strength and 
concern of that category in the year and then taking the net difference between adjusted 
strength and concern scores for that category. CSR_STK_ADJ (CSR_THIRD_ADJ) is the 
sum of corporate social responsibility (CSR) scores based on Deng et al. (2013). The 
concern (strength) scores for each of the MSCI’s evaluation dimensions，diversity, 
employees and products (community, environment and human rights), are calculated by 
dividing the raw concern (strength) scores by respective number of concern (strength) 
indicators to derive adjusted concern (strength) scores for that dimension. We then take 
the difference between the adjusted total strength scores and the adjusted total concern 
scores. We re-estimate Equation (1) using each of these subcomponents of CSR as the 
dependent variable. Table 4 respectively report the regression results using stakeholder 
CSR and third-party CSR as the dependent variables. Consistent with our examination of 
CSR strengths and concerns, columns (1), (3) and (5) presents the coefficient estimates 
using the OLS regression and columns (2), (4) and (6) present the coefficient estimates 
using regression that controls for firm fixed effects. 
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Table 4 shows that, using stakeholder CSR as the dependent variable (CSR_STK or 
CSR_STK_ADJ), the coefficients on PILOT×DUR are positive and significant at less than 
the one percent level across all specifications (columns (1) to (4)). Whereas, the 
coefficients on PILOT×DUR are not significant when the dependent variable is third-
party CSR (CSR_THIRD or CSR_THIRD_ADJ). These results suggest that, the enhanced 
CSR performance documented during the Reg SHO period for the main test is mainly 
driven by improved performance in stakeholder CSR rather than third-third party. 
 [TABLE 4 HERE] 
5. Additional tests 
5.1. Stakeholder’s CSR emphasis 
Prior studies suggest that the value of CSR differs in the degree of stakeholders’ 
CSR emphasis. Marquis et al. (2007) argue that “Standards of appropriateness regarding 
the nature and level of corporate social action are embedded within local communities, 
and organizational conformity to these institutionalized practices yields systematic 
patterns that vary by community” (p. 926). When stakeholders place greater emphasis on 
corporate social responsibility related issues, a firm’s CSR efforts are more likely to be 
appreciated by the stakeholders, and the stakeholders are likely to have stronger 
incentives to contribute resources and effort to the firm (Deng et al., 2013). To the extent 
that managers are aware of their stakeholder’s CSR emphasis as well as of the potential 
payoff from firms’ CSR performance, we expect that the enhancement in CSR 
performance for the pilot firms during the Reg SHO implementation period is more 
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pronounced for firms operating in an in environment that the CSR effort are likely to be 
emphasized by these firms’ stakeholders. 
To test our conjecture, we follow prior studies and proxy the degree of a firm’s 
stakeholders’ CSR emphasis based on whether the firm is headquartered in states 
controlled by the Democratic Party (blue states) or in states with high religiosity (e.g. Di 
Giuli and Kostovetsky, 2014; Deng et al., 2013; Rubin, 2008).10,11 A firm’s religiosity is 
measured as the average of the ratio of the number of religious adherents in the firm’s 
state to the total population in that state in 2000 and that of 2010.12 The information on 
the political leaning of a firm’s headquarter state (e.g. blue states or not) is obtained from 
internet websites.13 We then classify pilot-during firm-years (PILOT×DUR) into high 
(blue) versus low-religiosity (red state) groups according to the religiosity ratio (blue 
state status) for each year of the sample. We construct two sets of indicator variables: 
PILOT×DUR_HIGHR versus PILOT×DUR_LOWR and PILOT×DUR_BLUE versus 
PILOT×DUR_RED. The variable PILOT×DUR_HIGHR (PILOT×DUR_LOWR) equals 
one if a firm is a pilot firm and is headquartered in a state with the above (below) median 
religiosity during the Reg SHO period, and zero otherwise. The variable 
PILOT×DUR_BLUE (PILOT×DUR_RED) equals one if a firm is a pilot firm and is 
                                                 
10 Prior studies find significant geographic clustering in the views of outside stakeholders (see Porter, 1998, 
2000). Given that a firm’s headquarter is in general close to its core business (Pirinsky and Wang, 2006), 
we expect a firm to take the views of these stakeholder into consideration when forming their CSR 
decisions.  
11 Prior studies find that democratic voters and individuals with deep religious belief tend to place more 
emphasis on CSR-related issues such as environmental protection, anti-discrimination laws and 
employee protection (Hilary and Hui, 2009; Kumar et al., 2011; Di Giuli and Kostovetsky, 2014; Deng 
et al., 2013; Rubin, 2008). 
12 Every ten years, the Association of Religion Data Archive provides information on religiosity. We use 
the average religion ratio based on 2000 and 2010 data because our sample period (2001-2007) falls 
between this two years. 
13 We obtain the list of blue states based on the information on presidential election results at state level, 
which is collected from two sources: (1) www.uselectionatlas.org; and (2) 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Red_state_and blue_state.svg. 
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headquartered in a blue (red) state during the Reg SHO period, and zero otherwise. We 
then replace PILOT×DUR in Equation (1) with PILOT×DUR_HIGHR and 
PILOT×DUR_LOWR (PILOT×DUR_BLUE and PILOT×DUR_RED) 
Panel A (B) of Table 5 reports the regression results of the impact of Reg SHO on 
firm’s CSR (CSR or CSR_ADJ) for high (blue) versus low religiosity (red states). 
Columns (1) and (3) respectively present the coefficient estimates using the OLS 
regression and columns (2) and (4) present the coefficient estimates using regression that 
controls for firm fixed effects.  Panel A (B) shows that, across all columns, the 
coefficients on PILOT×DUR_HIGHR (PILOT×DUR_BLUE) are positive and significant, 
while the coefficients on PILOT×DUR_LOWR (PILOT×DUR_RED) are positive and 
insignificant. These results suggest that the positive impact of short selling pressure on 
firm’s CSR performance is more pronounced in an environment where the firm’s CSR 
activities are more likely to be appreciated by its stakeholders.  
5.2. Post-program 
On July 6, 2007, the SEC eliminated the uptick rule for all exchange-listed firms. 
As a result, short-sale constrains for control firms should decrease to a similar level as 
those for the pilot firms after July 2007. We expand our sample period to year 2010 and 
expand Equation (1) by including time indicator POST and its interaction with PILOT 
(PILOT×POST ) to check whether the CSR scores of the pilot firms revert to pre-program 
levels after the pilot program ends. Specifically, POST equals one if a firm-year’s fiscal 
end falls between January 1, 2008 and December 31, 2010, and zero otherwise. The 
definition of PILOT and other variables are the same as in Equation (1). Table 6 reports 
the results using both the OLS regressions and the regression with firm fixed effects. 
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Across columns (1) to (4), the coefficient on PILOT×POST is insignificant, suggesting a 
reverting pattern as the difference between the pilot and non-pilot firms’ CSR score after 
the pilot program is not statistically different from that before the program.14 
[TABLE 6 HERE] 
5.3. CSR disclosure 
Our results thus far are consistent with our argument that managers have incentives 
to create a positive firm image by enhancing CSR performance to deter short sellers. To 
add more credence to our argument, we examine whether managers actively convey the 
information relating to their firms’ CSR activities to potential audiences in the market 
(including short sellers). Specifically, we compare the change in the pilot firms’ 
likelihood of issuing standalone CSR reports before and after the Reg SHO period, with 
that of the control firms by estimating the following model: 
DISCLOSUREit = β0 + β1PILOTi×DURt + β2DURt + β3PILOTi + β4SIZEit-1  
+ β5LEVERAGEit-1 + β6MBit-1 + β7ROAit-1 + β8LIQUIDITYit-1 + β9DIVit-1  
+ β10COVERAGEit-1 + β11CSRit-1 + β12FORCASTit-1 + εit                      (2) 
where DISCLOSURE is an indicator variable that equals one if a firm issued a standalone 
CSR report during the year, and zero otherwise.15 See Appendix for detailed definitions 
of all the other variables.  
[TABLE 7 HERE] 
                                                 
14 The CSR measure we use, CSR is industry-adjusted. As a result, it is possible that our finding that pilot 
firms’ CSR scores reverted to pre-program levels after the pilot program could reflect changes in 
nonpilot firms’ CSR scores rather than changes in pilot firms’ CSR scores. So in untabulated results, we 
replace the industry-adjust CSR measures with the raw CSR scores and find consistent results. 
15 We collect standalone CSR reports for U.S. listed companies from the leading CSR report archive 
collections, Corporate Social Responsibility Newswire and CorporateRegister.com, and from our own 
Internet searches. 
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Table 7 shows that the coefficient on PILOT×DUR is positive and significant at the 
ten percent level, which suggests that managers are more likely to disclose information 
on their firms’ CSR activities when facing increased short-selling pressures. 
6. Conclusions 
In this study, we examine the impact of short selling on firm’s CSR performance. 
Using Reg SHO as a source of exogenous shock to short selling pressure, we find that 
managers significantly increase firms’ CSR performance when facing increasing short 
selling pressure. The increases in CSR are mainly driven by stakeholder CSR, rather than 
third party CSR; and by improvements in CSR strengths, rather than reductions in CSR 
concerns. Moreover, the positive impact of short selling pressure on firms’ CSR 
performance is more pronounced in an environment where the firms’ CSR activities are 
emphasized by their stakeholders. For example, we find that the positive impact of short 
selling pressure is stronger for firms headquarter in “blue” (liberal or Democratic-leaning) 
states than those headquarter in “red” (conservative or Republican-leaning) states, and for 
firms that are subject to more rather than less religious influence.   
Finally, we find that firms actively convey the information relating to their firms’ 
CSR activities to potential audiences in the market (including short sellers) by disclosing 
standalone CSR reports during the implementation of Reg SHO period. Overall, these 
results are consistent with our conjecture that, as a response to increasing short selling 
pressure, managers strategically alter CSR performance to deter short sellers by creating 
create a positive firm image. 
Our study adds to the extant literature that examines the real effects of secondary 
financial markets. Our results suggest that, while short selling is generally not welcome 
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by the managers, an unintended consequence of increasing short selling pressure is that 
managers are incentivized to enhance their firms’ non-financial performance. Our study 
also extend prior studies on the literature on determinants of CSR and how firms 
strategically use CSR to achieve its corporate goals. Our study suggest that short selling 
pressure is a significant contributor to a firm’s CSR decisions. Rather than increasing 
CSR to meet the demands of various stakeholders as documented in prior studies, firms 
use CSR as a tool to deter short sellers. 
  
 27 
References 
Adam Friedman Associates., 2012. Corporate social responsibility: Who’s responsible?.  
Available at http://www.prweb.com/releases/prweb2012/11/prweb10144917.htm.  
Anderson, J., Frankle, A., 1980. Voluntary social reporting: An iso-beta portfolio analysis. 
The Accounting Review 55(3), 467-479.  
Atkins, B., 2006. Is corporate social responsibility responsible?. Available at 
http://www.forbes.com/2006/11/16/leadership-philanthropy-charity-lead-citizen-
cx_ba_1128directorship.html 
Barnea, A., Rubin, A., 2010. Corporate social responsibility as a conflict between 
shareholders. Journal of Business Ethics, 97(1): 71-86. 
Bénabou, R., Tirole, J., 2010. Individual and corporate social responsibility. Economica, 
77(305), 1-19. 
Bond, P., Edmans, A., Goldstein, I., 2012. The real effects of financial markets. Annual 
Review of Financial Economics, 4, 339-360.  
Cheng, Q., Chen, X., Luo, T., Yue, H., 2014. Short sellers and corporate disclosures. 
Working paper, Singapore Management University. 
Chih, H., Shen, C., Kang, F., 2008. Corporate social responsibility, investor protection, 
and earnings management: Some international evidence. Journal of Business Ethics 
79(1-2), 179-198. 
Christensen, T., Drake, M., Thornock, J., 2014. Optimistic reporting and pessimistic 
investing: do pro forma earnings disclosures attract short sellers?. Contemporary 
Accounting Research 31(1), 67-102. 
De Angelis, D., Grullon, G., Michenaud, S., 2013. Downside risk and the design of CEO 
incentives: evidence from a natural experiment. Working paper, Rice University. 
Dhaliwal, D., Li, O., Tsang, A., Yang, Y., 2011. Voluntary nonfinancial disclosure and 
the cost of equity capital: The initiation of corporate social responsibility reporting. 
The Accounting Review 86(1), 59-100. 
Diether, K., Lee, K., Werner, I., 2009. It’s SHO time! Short-sale price tests and market 
quality. Journal of Finance 64(1), 37-73. 
Dong, H., Chen, L., Zhan, X. 2015. Do analysts curb corporate irresponsibility? Evidence 
from natural experiments. SSRN 
Drake, M., Rees, L., Swanson, E., 2011. Should investors follow the prophets or the bears? 
Evidence on the use of public information by analysts and short sellers. The 
Accounting Review 86(1), 101-13 
El Ghoul, S., Guedhami, O., Kwok, C., Mishra, D., 2011. Does corporate social 
responsibility affect the cost of capital?. Journal of Banking & Finance 35(9), 2388-
 28 
2406. 
Engelberg, J., Reed, A., Ringgenberg, M., 2012. How are shorts informed? Short sellers, 
news, and information processing. Journal of Financial Economics 105(2), 260-278. 
Fang, V., Huang, A., and Karpoff, J., 2015. Short selling and earnings management: A 
controlled experiment. Journal of Finance, forthcoming. 
Fieseler, C., 2011. On the corporate social responsibility perceptions of equity analysts. 
Business Ethics: A European Review 20(2), 131–147.  
Flammer, C., 2014. Does product market competition foster corporate social 
responsibility? Evidence from trade liberalization. Strategic Management Journal 
36(10), 1469-1485. 
Fombrun, C., Shanley, M., 1990. What's in a name? Reputation building and corporate 
strategy. Academy of Management Journal 33(2), 233-258. 
Fombrun, C., 1996. Reputation: realizing value from the corporate image. Harvard 
Business Review Press. 
Friedman, M., 1970. The social responsibility of business is to increase its profits. The 
New York Times Magazine September 13. 
Gao, F., Lisic, L., Zhang, I., 2014. Commitment to social good and insider trading. 
Journal of Accounting and Economics 57(2), 149-175. 
Godfrey, P., 2005. The relationship between corporate philanthropy and shareholder 
wealth: A risk management perspective. Academy of Management Review 30(4), 
777-798. 
Godfrey, P., Merrill, C. B., Hansen, J. M., 2009. The relationship between corporate 
social responsibility and shareholder value: An empirical test of the risk 
management hypothesis. Strategic Management Journal, 30(4), 425-445. 
Goldstein, I., Guembel, A., 2008. Manipulation and the allocational role of prices. The 
Review of Economic Studies 75(1), 133-164. 
Greening, D., Turban, D., 2000. Corporate social performance as a competitive advantage 
in attracting a quality workforce. Business & Society 39(3), 254-280 
Grullon, G., Michenaud, S., Weston, J., 2015. The real effects of short-selling constraints. 
Review of Financial Studies 28(6), 1737-1767. 
He, J., Tian, X., 2014. Short sellers and innovation: Evidence from a quasi-natural 
experiment. Working paper, University of Georgia. 
Hilary, G., Hui, K. W., 2009. Does religion matter in corporate decision making in 
America? Journal of Financial Economics 93(3), 455-473. 
Hoi, C., Wu, Q., Zhang, H., 2013. Is corporate social responsibility (CSR) associated 
with tax avoidance? Evidence from irresponsible CSR activities. The Accounting 
Review 88(6), 2025-2059. 
 29 
Hong, H., Liskovich, I., 2015. Crime, punishment and the halo effect of corporate social 
responsibility. Working paper, Princeton University. 
Jeffers, J., 2015. Goodwill hunting: Using corporate social responsibility as insurance. 
Working paper, University of Pennsylvania. 
Khanna, N., Mathews, R., 2012. Doing battle with short sellers: The conflicted role of 
blockholders in bear raids. Journal of Financial Economics 106(2), 229-246. 
Kim, Y., Park, M., Wier, B., 2012. Is earnings quality associated with corporate social 
responsibility?. The Accounting Review 87(3), 761-796. 
Kumar, A., Page, J. K., Spalt, O. G., 2011. Religious beliefs, gambling attitudes, and 
financial market outcomes. Journal of Financial Economics 102(3), 671-708. 
Laksanabunsong, C., Wu, W., 2014. Insider purchases amid short interest spikes: A semi-
pooling equilibrium. Working paper, University of Chicago. 
Lamont, O., 2012. Go down fighting: Short sellers vs. firms. Review of Asset Pricing 
Studies 2(1), 1-30. 
Lanis, R., Richardson, G., 2012. Corporate social responsibility and tax aggressiveness: 
An empirical analysis. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 31(1), 86-108. 
Lev, B., Petrovits, C., Radhakrishnan, S., 2010. Is doing good good for you? How 
corporate charitable contributions enhance revenue growth. Strategic Management 
Journal 31(2), 182-200. 
Li, Y., Zhang, L., 2015. Short selling pressure, stock price behavior, and management 
forecast precision: Evidence from a natural experiment. Journal of Accounting 
Research 53(1), 79-117. 
Liu, H., Swanson, E. P., 2011. Do corporate managers trade against short sellers? 
Working paper, Texas A&M University. 
Luo, X., Bhattacharya, C., 2006. Corporate social responsibility, customer satisfaction, 
and market value. Journal of Marketing 70(4), 1-18. 
Margolis, J., Elfenbein, H., Walsh, J., 2007. Does it pay to be good... and does it matter? 
A meta-analysis of the relationship between corporate social and financial 
performance. Working paper. University of Michigan. 
Marquis, C., Glynn, M. A., Davis, G. F., 2007. Community isomorphism and corporate 
social action. Academy of Management Review 32(3), 925-945. 
McWilliams, A., Siegel, D., Wright, P., 2006. Corporate social responsibility: Strategic 
implications. Journal of Management Studies 43(1), 1-18. 
Minor, D., Morgan, J., 2011. CSR as reputation insurance: Primum non nocere. 
California Management Review 53(3), 40-59. 
Mitchell, M., Pulvino, T., Stafford, E., 2004. Price pressure around mergers. Journal of 
 30 
Finance 59(1), 31-63. 
NYSE, 2008. Short selling study: The views of corporate issuers. Available at 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-26-08/s72608-152b.pdf. 
Petrovits, C., 2006. Corporate-sponsored foundations and earnings management. Journal 
of Accounting and Economics 41(3), 335-362. 
Pirinsky, C., Wang. Q., 2006. Does corporate headquarters location matter for stock 
returns?. Journal of Finance 61(4), 1991-2015. 
Porter, M., 1998. Location, clusters, and the new ‘micro’ economics of competition. 
Business Economics, 33(1), 7-13. 
Porter, M., 2000. Location, competition, and economic development: Local clusters in a 
global economy. Economic Development Quarterly, 14(1), 15-34. 
Porter, M., Kramer, M., 2006. The link between competitive advantage and corporate 
social responsibility. Harvard Business Review 84(12), 78-92. 
Richardson, A., and Welker, M., 2001. Social disclosure, financial disclosure and the cost 
of equity capital. Accounting, Organizations and Society 26(7), 597-616. 
Rubin, A., 2008. Political views and corporate decision making: the case of corporate 
social responsibility. Financial Review 43(3), 337-360. 
Servaes, H., and A. Tamayo., 2013. The impact of corporate social responsibility on firm 
value: The role of customer awareness. Management Science 59(5), 1045-61 
Soros, G., 2009. One way to stop bear raids. The Wall Street Journal. Available at 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB123785310594719693 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 31 
Appendix: Variable definitions 
Dependent variables 
CSR is the sum of a firm’s CSR scores calculated as a firm’s total strengths minus total 
weaknesses, based on MSCI’s evaluations for community relations, humanity, 
diversity, employee relations, environment, and product characteristics. Following 
Dhaliwal et al. (2011), we adjust the CSR scores by industry median to make them 
comparable across industries.  
CSR_ADJ is the sum of a firm’s CSR scores calculated based on Deng et al. (2013). The 
concern (strength) scores for each of the MSCI’s evaluation dimensions (e.g., 
community relations, humanity, diversity, employee relations, environment, and 
product characteristics) are calculated by dividing the raw concern (strength) scores 
by respective number of concern (strength) indicators to derive adjusted concern 
(strength) scores for that dimension. We then take the difference between the 
adjusted total strength scores and the adjusted total concern scores. 
CSR_CON is the sum of a firm’s industry adjusted concern scores over community 
relations, humanity, diversity, employee relations, environment, and product 
characteristics. 
CSR_STR is the sum of a firm’s industry adjusted strength scores over community 
relations, humanity, diversity, employee relations, environment, and product 
characteristics. 
CSR_CON_ADJ is the sum of a firm’s concern scores based on Deng et al. (2013). The 
concern scores for each of the MSCI’s evaluation dimensions (e.g., community 
relations, humanity, diversity, employee relations, environment, and product 
characteristics) are calculated by dividing the raw concern scores by respective 
number of concern indictors to derived adjusted concern scores for that dimension. 
CSR_STR_ADJ is the sum of a firm’s strength scores based on Deng et al. (2013). The 
strength scores for each of the MSCI’s evaluation dimensions (e.g., community 
relations, humanity, diversity, employee relations, environment, and product 
characteristics) are calculated by dividing the raw strength scores by respective 
number of strength indictors to derived adjusted strength scores for that dimension. 
CSR_STK is the sum of industry adjusted corporate social responsibility (CSR) scores 
over diversity, employees and products. It is estimated by scaling the raw strength 
and concern scores of each category by the number of items of the strength and 
concern of that category in the year and then taking the net difference between 
adjusted strength and concern scores for that category. 
CSR_THIRD is the sum of industry adjusted corporate social responsibility (CSR) scores 
over community, environment and human rights. It is estimated by scaling the raw 
strength and concern scores of each category by the number of items of the strength 
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and concern of that category in the year and then taking the net difference between 
adjusted strength and concern scores for that category. 
CSR_STK_ADJ is the sum of corporate social responsibility (CSR) scores based on Deng 
et al. (2013). The concern (strength) scores for each of the MSCI’s evaluation 
dimensions，diversity, employees and products， are calculated by dividing the 
raw concern (strength) scores by respective number of concern (strength) indicators 
to derive adjusted concern (strength) scores for that dimension. We then take the 
difference between the adjusted total strength scores and the adjusted total concern 
scores. 
CSR_THIRD_ADJ is the sum of corporate social responsibility (CSR) scores based on 
Deng et al. (2013). The concern (strength) scores for each of the MSCI’s evaluation 
dimensions，community, environment and human rights, are calculated by dividing 
the raw concern (strength) scores by respective number of concern (strength) 
indicators to derive adjusted concern (strength) scores for that dimension. We then 
take the difference between the adjusted total strength scores and the adjusted total 
concern scores. 
DISCLOSURE is an indicator variable that equals one if a firm issued a standalone CSR 
report during the year, and zero otherwise. 
 
Key independent variables 
PILOT is an indicator variable that equals one if the firm’s stock is designated as pilot 
stock in the Regulation SHO’s pilot program, and zero otherwise. Source: 
http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/shopilot.htm. 
DUR is an indicator variable that equals one if a firm’s fiscal year end falls between 
January 1, 2005 and December 31, 2007, and zero otherwise. 
POST is an indicator variable that equals one if a firm’s fiscal year end falls between 
January 1, 2008 and December 31, 2010, and zero otherwise. 
 
Control variables 
SIZE is the log of the market value of the firm (item 25 × item 199).  
LEVERAGE is long-term debt (item 9) over total asset (item 6).  
MB is the ratio of the market value of equity (item 25 × item 199) to book value of total 
equity (item 60).  
ROA is income before extraordinary items (item 18) divided by lagged total assets (item 
6).  
FIRM_AGE is the difference between the first year when the firm appears in CRSP and 
the current year.  
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LIQUIDITY is total common shares traded during the fiscal year (item 28) over total 
common shares outstanding (item 25).  
DIV is an indicator variable that equals one if the firm pays out dividends during the 
fiscal year (i.e., item 21 is greater than zero), and zero otherwise.  
LITIGATION is an indicator variable as defined in Dhaliwal (2011), which equals 1 if the 
firm operates in a high-litigation industry (i.e., SIC codes of 2833–2836, 3570–3577, 
3600–3674, 5200–5961, and 7370), and 0 otherwise.  
GLOBAL is an indicator variable as defined in Dhaliwal (2011), which equals 1 if the 
firm has foreign income (i.e., item 273 greater than zero), and zero otherwise. 
COVERAGE is an indicator variable that equals one if the firm is covered by at least one 
analyst during the fiscal year, and zero otherwise. Source: I/B/E/S. 
FORECAST is an indicator variable that equals one if the company issues one or more 
management forecast during the fiscal year, and zero otherwise. 
 
Variables in additional tests 
PILOT×DUR_HIGHR is an indicator variable that equals one if a firm is a pilot firm and 
is headquartered in a state with the above median religiosity during the Reg SHO 
period, and zero otherwise. A firm’s religiosity is measured as the average of the 
ratio of the number of religious adherents in the firm’s state to the total population in 
that state in 2000 and that of 2010.   
PILOT×DUR_LOWR is an indicator variable that equals one if a firm is a pilot firm and 
is headquartered in a state with the below median religiosity during the Reg SHO 
period, and zero otherwise. A firm’s religiosity is measured as the average of the 
ratio of the number of religious adherents in the firm’s state to the total population in 
that state in 2000 and that of 2010.  
PILOT×DUR_BLUE equals one if a firm is a pilot firm and is headquartered in a blue 
state during the Reg SHO period, and zero otherwise.  
PILOT×DUR_RED equals one if a firm is a pilot firm and is headquartered in a red state 
during the Reg SHO period, and zero otherwise.  
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Table 1  
Descriptive statistics 
Panel A: Firm characteristics - full sample 
Mean SD 25% Median 75% 
CSR 0.082 2.044 -1.000 0.000 1.000 
CSR_ADJ -0.014 0.363 -0.207 0.000 0.200 
SIZE 7.384 1.482 6.280 7.205 8.272 
MB 3.387 3.711 1.661 2.531 4.076 
LEVERAGE 0.181 0.184 0.005 0.150 0.285 
ROA 0.043 0.139 0.015 0.058 0.107 
FIRM_AGE 21.911 16.288 9.000 15.000 35.000 
LIQUIDITY 2.227 1.810 1.024 1.710 2.812 
DIV 0.467 0.499 0.000 0.000 1.000 
LITIGATION 0.296 0.457 0.000 0.000 1.000 
GLOBAL 0.541 0.498 0.000 1.000 1.000 
COVERAGE 2.042 1.085 1.609 2.303 2.833 
n 7,966 
Panel B: Firm characteristics of the treatment and control groups in 2003 
Pilot Firms (n=617) Control Firms (n=1262)  
Mean SD Mean SD Diff. t-stat 
CSR -0.105 1.729 0.046 1.895 -0.152 -1.47 
CSR_ADJ -0.079 0.345 -0.057 0.346 -0.022 1.31 
SIZE 6.901 1.526 6.829 1.525 0.073 0.97 
MB 0.187 0.182 0.180 0.188 0.007 0.73 
LEVERAGE 2.956 3.233 2.729 3.222 0.227 1.43 
ROA 0.023 0.145 0.013 0.148 0.010 1.41 
FIRM_AGE 21.303 15.966 19.605 15.636 1.698** 2.19 
LIQUIDITY 1.991 1.790 2.105 1.854 -0.114 -1.26 
DIV 0.449 0.498 0.399 0.490 0.050** 2.05 
LITIGATION 0.327 0.470 0.306 0.461 0.022 0.94 
GLOBAL 0.475 0.500 0.479 0.500 -0.005 -0.18 
COVERAGE 1.928 1.115 1.897 1.120 0.031 0.56 
Panel C: CSR scores before and during the pilot program 
Pilot Firms (n=617) Control Firms (n=1262)  
Mean SD n Mean SD n Diff. t-stat 
CSR 
Pre (2001-2003) -0.015 1.807 1047 0.121 2.039 2183 -0.136 -1.84 
Dur (2005-2007) 0.156 2.014 1530 0.052 2.131 3206 0.104 1.60 
CSR_ADJ 
Pre (2001-2003) -0.056 0.343 1047 -0.034 0.362 2183 -0.022 -1.63 
Dur (2005-2007) 0.163 0.361 1530 -0.002 0.371 3206 0.019 1.43
This table reports distribution of the variables in the final sample of our main test. See Appendix A for 
variable definitions. 
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Table 2 
Changes in CSR performance around the Reg SHO experiment 
 Dep. = CSR Dep. = CSR_ADJ 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
PILOT×DUR 0.265*** 0.170*** 0.046*** 0.032***
(2.76) (2.86) (2.65) (2.82) 
DUR -0.097 0.027 -0.028 -0.012 
(-0.67) (0.28) (-1.06) (-0.66) 
PILOT -0.193*** -0.029**  
(-2.59) (-2.13)  
SIZE 0.250*** 0.081** 0.008** 0.010 
(12.21) (2.17) (2.07) (1.43) 
LEVERAGE -0.525*** -0.235 -0.076*** -0.026 
(-3.92) (-1.38) (-3.12) (-0.81) 
MB 0.021*** -0.009 0.006*** -0.001 
(3.18) (-1.63) (4.85) (-1.14) 
ROA 0.421** 0.258 0.109*** 0.062* 
(2.32) (1.44) (3.31) (1.83) 
FIRM_AGE -0.001 0.177*** -0.001** 0.021*** 
(-0.38) (7.84) (-2.54) (4.99) 
LIQUIDITY -0.034** -0.026* -0.002 -0.006** 
(-2.43) (-1.73) (-0.84) (-2.08) 
DIV -0.002 0.010 0.013 -0.004 
(-0.04) (0.15) (1.28) (-0.30) 
LITIGATION 0.222** 0.037**  
(2.24) (2.07)  
GLOBAL 0.147*** -0.089 0.016* -0.010 
(2.82) (-1.28) (1.69) (-0.79) 
COVERAGE 0.146*** -0.064** 0.031*** -0.004 
(6.29) (-1.98) (7.27) (-0.60) 
Constant -1.990*** -4.416*** -0.027 -0.542*** 
 (-4.27) (-7.89) (-0.32) (-5.11)
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes  
Firm Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.087 0.034 0.047 0.043 
n 7,966 7,966 7,966 7,966 
This table presents results on changes in CSR performance around the Reg SHO experiment. All 
continuous independent variables are winsorized at the top and bottom one-percentiles. The t-values 
are reported in parentheses. The t-values in column (1) and (3) are based on standard errors clustered 
by firm.*,**,*** indicate that the estimated coefficient is statistically significant at the 10, 5 and 1 
percent levels, respectively. See Appendix A for variable definitions. 
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Table 3 
Changes in CSR strengths and CSR concerns around the Reg SHO experiment 
 Dep. = CSR_STR Dep. = CSR_STR_ADJ Dep. = CSR_CON Dep. = CSR_CON_ADJ 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
PILOT×DUR 0.175** 0.126*** 0.025** 0.019*** -0.093 -0.069 -0.025 -0.019*
(2.15) (2.77) (2.18) (2.95) (-1.52) (-1.60) (-1.60) (-1.80) 
DUR -0.206* -0.140* -0.028 -0.017 0.009 -0.001 0.003 0.004 
(-1.67) (-1.90) (-1.59) (-1.61) (0.10) (-0.02) (0.17) (0.23) 
PILOT -0.192*** -0.026***  0.030  0.009  
(-3.05) (-2.89)  (0.64)  (0.88)  
SIZE 0.729*** 0.108*** 0.101*** 0.015*** 0.411*** 0.037 0.080*** 0.005 
(41.99) (3.75) (41.47) (3.56) (31.16) (1.37) (27.31) (0.90) 
LEVERAGE -0.480*** 0.027 -0.071*** 0.004 -0.038 -0.262** -0.007 -0.031 
(-4.22) (0.20) (-4.42) (0.23) (-0.44) (-2.14) (-0.36) (-1.15) 
MB -0.015*** -0.005 -0.002** -0.001 -0.034*** -0.001 -0.007*** 0.001 
(-2.74) (-1.17) (-2.46) (-1.09) (-8.21) (-0.26) (-7.36) (0.60) 
ROA -0.898*** -0.406*** -0.126*** -0.058*** -1.055*** -0.441*** -0.200*** -0.099*** 
(-5.85) (-2.97) (-5.85) (-3.00) (-9.16) (-3.44) (-7.83) (-3.45) 
FIRM_AGE 0.018*** 0.286*** 0.002*** 0.040*** 0.016*** 0.089*** 0.003*** 0.014*** 
(11.92) (16.58) (11.67) (16.35) (14.59) (5.44) (11.73) (3.89) 
LIQUIDITY -0.065*** -0.019 -0.009*** -0.002 -0.017* 0.034*** -0.005** 0.006*** 
(-5.51) (-1.63) (-5.66) (-1.46) (-1.93) (3.12) (-2.45) (2.64) 
DIV -0.024 0.095** -0.002 0.011 0.014 0.132*** -0.009 0.017* 
(-0.51) (1.98) (-0.26) (1.54) (0.39) (2.90) (-1.12) (1.69) 
LITIGATION 0.167** 0.027**  -0.030  -0.005  
(1.99) (2.28)  (-0.47)  (-0.34)  
GLOBAL 0.203*** 0.028 0.026*** 0.003 0.054 0.042 0.010 0.005 
(4.61) (0.52) (4.17) (0.39) (1.64) (0.83) (1.41) (0.44) 
COVERAGE 0.042** -0.074*** 0.006** -0.010*** -0.108*** -0.077*** -0.025*** -0.015*** 
(2.15) (-2.98) (2.31) (-2.94) (-7.26) (-3.25) (-7.45) (-2.85) 
Constant -5.444*** -6.524*** -0.738*** -0.908*** -3.155*** -1.853*** -0.663*** -0.303*** 
 (-13.79) (-15.77) (-13.30) (-15.43) (-10.54) (-4.80) (-9.97) (-3.52)
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  
Firm Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
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Adjusted R2 0.335 0.240 0.328 0.241 0.227 0.063 0.184 0.042 
n 7,966 7,966 7,966 7,966 7,966 7,966 7,966 7,966 
This table presents results on changes in CSR concerns and CSR strengths around the Reg SHO experiment. All continuous independent variables are 
winsorized at the top and bottom one-percentiles. The t-values are reported in parentheses. The t-values in column (1), (3), (5) and (7) are based on standard 
errors clustered by firm.*,**,*** indicate that the estimated coefficient is statistically significant at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. See Appendix 
A for variable definitions. 
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Table 4 
Changes in stakeholder CSR and third-party CSR around the Reg SHO experiment 
 Dep. = CSR_STK Dep. = CSR_STK_ADJ Dep. = CSR_THIRD Dep. = CSR_THIRD_ADJ 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
PILOT×DUR 0.237*** 0.170*** 0.048*** 0.038*** 0.016 -0.010 0.002 -0.002
(3.10) (3.42) (3.18) (3.81) (0.36) (-0.34) (0.33) (-0.51) 
DUR -0.012 0.090 -0.017 -0.006 -0.074 -0.038 -0.010 -0.004 
(-0.10) (1.12) (-0.76) (-0.38) (-1.10) (-0.84) (-0.97) (-0.65) 
PILOT -0.156***  -0.027**  -0.033  -0.004  
(-2.63)  (-2.34)  (-0.95)  (-0.83)  
SIZE 0.286*** 0.161*** 0.018*** 0.023*** -0.038*** -0.082*** -0.010*** -0.012*** 
(17.51) (5.13) (5.58) (3.63) (-3.98) (-4.63) (-7.21) (-4.62) 
LEVERAGE -0.493*** -0.223 -0.072*** -0.022 -0.049 0.001 -0.006 -0.003 
(-4.61) (-1.56) (-3.43) (-0.77) (-0.79) (0.02) (-0.68) (-0.22) 
MB 0.010* -0.007 0.004*** -0.001 0.011*** -0.003 0.002*** -0.000 
(1.84) (-1.60) (3.75) (-1.20) (3.50) (-1.00) (3.99) (-0.86) 
ROA 0.244* 0.201 0.070** 0.036 0.231*** 0.135 0.038*** 0.019 
(1.69) (1.34) (2.48) (1.20) (2.75) (1.60) (3.05) (1.52) 
FIRM_AGE 0.002* 0.118*** -0.000 0.015*** -0.003*** 0.056*** -0.001*** 0.008*** 
(1.71) (6.23) (-0.88) (3.96) (-3.61) (5.32) (-4.75) (4.84) 
LIQUIDITY -0.016 -0.028** 0.000 -0.005* -0.022*** -0.014** -0.002** -0.002 
(-1.44) (-2.22) (0.08) (-1.92) (-3.34) (-2.00) (-2.51) (-1.43) 
DIV 0.053 0.040 0.022** 0.003 -0.063** -0.044 -0.010** -0.006 
(1.21) (0.76) (2.57) (0.24) (-2.46) (-1.47) (-2.56) (-1.41) 
LITIGATION 0.089  0.018  0.133***  0.018***  
(1.12)  (1.18)  (2.90)  (2.66)  
GLOBAL 0.112*** -0.056 0.009 -0.009 0.038 -0.027 0.006 -0.003 
(2.71) (-0.97) (1.17) (-0.72) (1.58) (-0.81) (1.60) (-0.70) 
COVERAGE 0.092*** -0.035 0.024*** 0.002 0.053*** -0.037** 0.008*** -0.006*** 
(4.97) (-1.28) (6.52) (0.37) (4.93) (-2.45) (4.77) (-2.63) 
Constant -2.502*** -3.830*** -0.143** -0.513*** -0.318 -0.555** 0.001 -0.070* 
 (-6.74) (-8.17) (-1.96) (-5.43) (-1.47) (-2.11) (0.02) (-1.79)
Year Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  
Firm Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
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Adjusted R2 0.114 0.040 0.052 0.054 0.092 0.016 0.096 0.015 
n 7,966 7,966 7,966 7,966 7,966 7,966 7,966 7,966 
This table presents results on changes in stakeholder CSR and third-party CSR around the Reg SHO experiment. All continuous independent variables are 
winsorized at the top and bottom one-percentiles. The t-values are reported in parentheses. The t-values in column (1), (3), (5) and (7) are based on standard 
errors clustered by firm. *,**,*** indicate that the estimated coefficient is statistically significant at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. See Appendix 
A for variable definitions. 
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Table 5 
Changes in CSR performance around the Reg SHO experiment for high versus low stakeholder 
emphasis 
Panel A: High versus low religiosity 
 Dep. = CSR Dep. = CSR Dep. = CSR_ADJ Dep. = CSR_ADJ
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
PILOT×DUR_HIGH
R 
0.294*** 0.181** 0.049*** 0.032** 
(2.98) (2.53) (2.63) (2.34) 
PILOT×DUR_LOWR 0.159 0.133* 0.029 0.023
 (1.59) (1.82) (1.55) (1.62) 
DUR -0.030 0.051 -0.014 -0.008 
(-0.23) (0.56) (-0.55) (-0.45) 
PILOT -0.128* -0.018  
(-1.90) (-1.46)  
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes  
Firm Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.072 0.028 0.042 0.039 
n 7,966 7,966 7,966 7,966
Panel B: Blue versus red states 
 Dep. = CSR Dep. = CSR Dep. = CSR_ADJ Dep. = CSR_ADJ
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
PILOT×DUR_BLUE 0.364*** 0.238*** 0.065*** 0.043*** 
(3.46) (3.29) (3.38) (3.16) 
PILOT×DUR_RED 0.125 0.076 0.020 0.016 
 (1.10) (0.92) (0.98) (1.01)
DUR -0.099 0.028 -0.028 -0.012 
(-0.68) (0.29) (-1.07) (-0.65) 
PILOT -0.193*** -0.029**  
(-2.59) (-2.13)  
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes  
Firm Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.087 0.035 0.047 0.043 
n 7,966 7,966 7,966 7,966 
This table presents results on changes in CSR performance around the Reg SHO experiment for 
high versus low stakeholder emphasis. Panel A (B) presents the regression results using 
religiosity (blue or red states).  All continuous independent variables are winsorized at the top and 
bottom one-percentiles. The t-values are reported in parentheses. The t-values in column (1) and 
(3) are based on standard errors clustered by firm*,**,*** indicate that the estimated coefficient 
is statistically significant at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. See Appendix A for 
variable definitions. 
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Table 6 
Changes in CSR performance around the end of the Reg SHO experiment 
 Dep. = CSR Dep. = CSR_ADJ 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
PILOT×DUR 0.241** 0.152** 0.039** 0.026**
(2.33) (2.33) (2.10) (2.10) 
PILOT×POST 0.166 0.016 0.029 0.006 
(1.55) (0.24) (1.50) (0.49) 
DUR 1.009*** -2.865*** 0.097* -0.487*** 
(3.46) (-5.66) (1.84) (-5.08)
POST 0.989*** -2.966*** 0.109** -0.484*** 
(3.99) (-5.95) (2.44) (-5.12) 
PILOT -0.181** -0.026*  
(-2.20) (-1.73)  
SIZE 0.311*** 0.014 0.019*** 0.004 
(17.85) (0.53) (6.17) (0.69)
LEVERAGE -0.403*** -0.119 -0.060*** -0.015 
(-3.57) (-0.90) (-2.92) (-0.61) 
MB 0.023*** -0.009** 0.006*** -0.001* 
(4.04) (-2.06) (5.62) (-1.68) 
ROA 0.162 0.450*** 0.076*** 0.069***
(1.04) (3.23) (2.71) (2.62) 
FIRM_AGE 0.003** 0.493*** -0.000 0.072*** 
(2.10) (9.80) (-0.91) (7.55) 
LIQUIDITY -0.018 0.005 0.001 -0.000 
(-1.55) (0.45) (0.36) (-0.22) 
DIV 0.018 0.021 0.018** 0.004
(0.39) (0.39) (2.09) (0.42) 
LITIGATION 0.254*** 0.042***  
(3.02) (2.77)  
GLOBAL 0.152*** -0.106* 0.020** -0.012 
(3.33) (-1.93) (2.41) (-1.16)
COVERAGE 0.150*** 0.003 0.031*** 0.009* 
(7.03) (0.10) (8.06) (1.80) 
Constant -2.844*** -9.497*** -0.191** -1.388*** 
 (-6.90) (-11.06) (-2.56) (-8.53) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes  
Firm Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.104 0.053 0.053 0.043 
n 12,333 12,333 12,333 12,333 
This table presents results on changes in CSR performance around the end of the Reg SHO 
experiment. All continuous independent variables are winsorized at the top and bottom one-
percentiles. The t-values are reported in parentheses. The t-values in column (1) and (3) are based 
on standard errors clustered by firm. *,**,*** indicate that the estimated coefficient is statistically 
significant at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. See Appendix A for variable definitions. 
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Table 7 
Changes in the likelihood of CSR disclosure around the Reg SHO experiment 
Dep. = DISCLOSURE 
PILOT×DUR 0.486* 
 (1.71)
DUR -0.650* 
 (-1.76) 
PILOT -0.106 
 (-0.46) 
SIZE 0.821***
(5.62) 
LEVERAGE 0.143 
 (0.25) 
MB -2.725*** 
 (-3.26) 
ROA 0.662***
 (3.08) 
LIQUIDITY -0.282 
(-0.86) 
DIV 0.666*** 
 (3.37)
COVERAGE -0.002 
(-0.33) 
LAG_CSR 1.193*** 
 (17.88) 
FORECAST 0.000 
 (1.18)
Constant -33.226 
 (-0.08) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes 
n 6,564
This table presents results on changes in the likelihood of CSR disclosure around the Reg SHO 
experiment. All continuous independent variables are winsorized at the top and bottom one-
percentiles. The t-values based on standard errors clustered by firm are reported in parentheses. 
*,**,*** indicate that the estimated coefficient is statistically significant at the 10, 5 and 1 percent 
levels, respectively. See Appendix A for variable definitions. 
 
 
 
